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Time’s Up, Councilman: Why 
Military Commissions Warrant 
Exemption from Abstention 
Doctrine 
Alex W. S. Lilly* 
In 2017, two Guantánamo Bay detainees filed writs of 
certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States. Through 
different claims, both men argued that the military commissions 
convened to prosecute them lacked subject matter jurisdiction to 
do so. The first man, Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul, 
challenged his conspiracy conviction on the basis that it is 
unconstitutional to try purely domestic offenses in a non-Article 
III tribunal. The second, Abd al Rahim al-Nashiri, has not yet 
been tried. As such, he raised pretrial objections to his military 
commission’s competence to try him for crimes committed pre-
9/11. In October 2017, the Supreme Court denied both petitions 
for certiorari. 
The Court’s denial of both petitions had a devastating 
impact on each defendant individually. For Bahlul, it upheld 
both a life sentence and the lower D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals’ questionable determination that military commissions 
may try purely domestic offenses—like conspiracy—without 
violating Article III. In Nashiri, the D.C. Circuit determined 
that Councilman abstention—the doctrine that generally 
prevents federal habeas review of military proceedings until 
post-conviction appeal—applies to Nashiri’s case. By declining 
to grant his writ, the Court foreclosed Nashiri’s opportunity to 
raise a basic jurisdictional challenge until after his eventual 
conviction years down the road. 
Refusing to hear these cases also contributed to a larger 
public policy problem looming over the military commissions. 
Both natural justice and rational terrorism policy require 
judicial processes that can efficiently and definitively prosecute 
those who commit horrendous crimes.  Still, despite an 
American justice system that purports to be a beacon of the rule 
of law in the world, our courts display continued and outright 
aversion to resolving important questions posed by foreign 
defendants. In their current form, the military commissions 
 
* J.D. candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, May 
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system and corresponding appeals process provide minimal due 
process while leaving basic constitutional and statutory questions 
unanswered. This sad state of affairs contributes to animosity 
toward the “war on terror” abroad, forces victims to wait years 
for uncertain outcomes, and undermines the basic assumption 
that American justice is grounded in the rule of law. 
Bahlul and Nashiri, together, are illustrative of this 
problem. The Nashiri court’s broadening of Councilman 
abstention now bars every Guantánamo detainee from raising 
collateral jurisdictional challenges to the military commissions. 
Such foreseeable challenges include—but are not limited to—the 
same paramount constitutional question previously raised in 
Bahlul.  
In short, the Supreme Court’s refusal to hear both cases 
allows Article III courts to duck the responsibility to reach the 
merits on these questions anytime soon. I propose that Congress 
amend the 2009 Military Commissions Act to create an 
exception to Councilman abstention for military commissions—
forcing federal courts to confront these cases on their merits, 
and providing the certainty and finality of process that terrorist 
prosecutions so badly need. 
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Introduction 
On October 12, 2000, the U.S.S. Cole, a U.S. navy destroyer, was 
on its way to join a fleet of warships tasked with enforcing American 
trade sanctions against Iraq.1 It stopped to refuel in Aden, Yemen, 
and was scheduled to remain at port for a short four hours before re-
embarking on its mission.2 At 12:15PM local time, however, an 
explosion erupted, tearing through the ship’s port side and into the 
engine room, the mess, and the living quarters.3 Seventeen U.S. sailors 
were killed and 38 more were injured.4 The culprit was a small, 
motorized rubber dinghy manned by two suicide bombers and alleged 
 
1. This Day in History: October 12, HISTORY (last updated Aug. 21, 2018), 
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/uss-cole-attacked-by-
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al Qaeda affiliates.5 The attack’s success brought its mastermind—
Abd al Rahim al-Nashiri—immediate status within al Qaeda and led 
to Nashiri’s subsequent appointment as chief of the terrorist network’s 
operations for the Arabian Peninsula.6 
After the attack, a man named Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al 
Bahlul created what became a popular propaganda video celebrating 
the bombing of the Cole and encouraging jihad targeting the United 
States.7 Impressed with the video and its popularity, then-Saudi exile 
Osama bin Laden8 appointed Bahlul as one of his top aides and public 
relations secretary.9 Bahlul quickly became the indispensable 
brainchild of al Qaeda’s propaganda and recruitment machine, leading 
one United States federal appeals court judge to liken him to Joseph 
Goebbels10—Hitler’s infamous propaganda minister in 1930s Nazi 
Germany. He wrote public statements for bin Laden, maintained al 
Qaeda databases, and arranged two of the 9/11 hijacker’s loyalty 
oaths and “martyr wills.”11 Bahlul even attempted to participate in 
the commission of the 9/11 attacks himself, but bin Laden refused. As 
 
5. Id. 
6. Al Qaeda Aims at the American Homeland, NAT’L COMM’N ON 
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U. S. (last visited Jan. 2, 2018), 
https://9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch5.htm 
[http://perma.cc/54G8-RJS9]. 
7. Al Bahlul v. United States: D.C. Circuit Reinterprets Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 to Allow Retroactive Prosecution of 
Conspiracy to Commit War Crimes, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2040 (May 10, 
2015) (citing Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1, 5-6 (D.C. Cir. 
2014)). 
8. Osama Bin Laden: Timeline (last visited Jan. 1, 2019) 
http://www.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/people/shows/binladen/timeline.
html [https://perma.cc/LT75-X7SU]. 
9. HARV. L. REV. supra note 7 (citing Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 
1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). 
10. Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman Al Bahlul v. United States, 416 U.S. App 
.D.C. 340, 792 F.3d 1, 367 (2015) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (citing 
Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1, 33-34, 412 U.S. App. D.C. 372 
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (Henderson, J., concurring)). 
11. Samantha Arrington Sliney, U.S. v. Al Bahlul: Where It’s Been and 
Where It’s Going, HARVARD L. SCHOOL NAT’L SEC. J. (March 22, 2016), 
available at http://harvardnsj.org/2016/03/us-v-al-bahlul/ 
[http://perma.cc/9MHH-G2W6] (citing United States v. Al Bahlul, 820 
F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1162 (2011)); see also Lydia Wheeler, Appeals court 
upholds conspiracy conviction for al Qaeda publicist, THE HILL (Oct. 20, 
2016), http://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/302004-federal-
appeals-court-upholds-conspiracy-conviction-for-al-qaeda) (A martyr will 
is a “propaganda [declaration] documenting al Qaeda’s role in the 
attacks.”). 
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the terrorist network’s resident “media man,” Bahlul was too valuable 
to lose.12 
In the context of the post-9/11 American political landscape, 
Bahlul and Nashiri are decidedly unsympathetic defendants. Both 
men were eventually captured;13 both were charged in military 
commission trials with various crimes related to the “war on terror,”14 
and both are currently held at the United States military stronghold 
in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.15  
Neither is a stranger to the federal appeals system. In different 
capacities, both men have made their rounds through the United 
States Court of Military Commission Review (CMCR) and the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals (D.C. Circuit)—the designated appellate 
tribunals for trials conducted by military commission—for the greater 
part of the last decade.16 After the Supreme Court denied both of 
 
12. Sliney, supra note 11 (citing Bahlul, 767 F.3d at 6). 
13. Bahlul was captured in December 2001. In 2002, Bahlul was sent from 
Pakistan to Guantánamo Bay, Cuba and Nashiri was captured and held 
at CIA “black sites” for several years. Harry Graver, Military 
Commissions Loom Large at Supreme Court, LAWFARE (Oct. 3, 2017), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/ military-commissions-loom-large-
supreme-court [http://perma.cc/EF6M-U84X].  
14. See, e.g., Matthew Bloom, “I Did Not Come Here To Defend Myself”: 
Responding to War on Terror Detainees’ Attempts To Dismiss Counsel 
and Boycott the Trial, 117 YALE L. J. 70 (2007) (describing Bahlul and 
other Guantánamo defendants as “war on terror detainees” who were 
tried pursuant to George W. Bush’s 2001 military order sanctioning 
terrorist prosecutions in military commissions). See also Carol 
Rosenberg, Conviction of Guantánamo’s Lone Lifer Won’t Be Reviewed 
by Supreme Court, MIAMI HERALD (Oct. 10, 2017), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-
world/world/americas/guantanamo /article178042466.html 
[http://perma.cc/8MFX-MW8B] (noting that the merits of Nashiri’s 
claims largely pivot on when the United States’ “War on Terror” 
began). 
15. Bahlul is currently serving a life sentence at Guanántamo. See 
Rosenberg, supra note 14. As of March 2018, Nashiri is still in custody 
at Guantánamo. He will remain through the conclusion of his military 
commission prosecution, which has been delayed following significant 
controversy since October 2017. Charlie Savage, Guantánamo Lawyers 
Challenge Government’s Explanation for Hidden Microphone, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/03/12/us/politics/guantanamo-hidden-microphone.html 
[http://perma.cc /6DKT-XKFC]. 
16. See Graver, supra note 13 (outlining the progression of the cases). See 
also USS Cole Bombing Fast Facts, CNN (last updated Oct. 15, 2018), 
https://www.cnn.com/2013/09/18/world/meast/uss-cole-bombing-fast-
facts/index.html [https://perma.cc/FZ9N-QF9M] (providing a timeline 
of events following the USS Cole bombing). 
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their writs of certiorari in October 2017,17 Bahlul will serve out the 
rest of his life in detention and18 Nashiri’s trial and appeals process 
will continue indefinitely,19 consuming an outrageous amount of 
federal resources over the coming decade.20 
This Note does not attempt to evaluate the claims Bahlul and 
Nashiri raise on their merits. Instead, I propose a practical, legislative 
mechanism to ensure that constitutional questions hanging over the 
military commissions are resolved in a timely manner. 
Part I of this Note provides a brief history of the military 
commissions system in the United States. Moreover, it describes how 
commissions at Guantánamo came to be pursuant to the Military 
Commissions Acts of 2006 and 2009. 
Part II reviews the procedural history of Bahlul v. United States, 
describes the charge of “conspiracy” as it is traditionally applied in 
U.S. domestic and international law, and discusses the Supreme 
Court’s denial of certiorari in Bahlul. 
Part III discusses Nashiri v. Trump and the Court’s decision to 
deny certiorari in that case less than a week after declining to hear 
Bahlul. 
In Part IV, I analyze the Councilman abstention doctrine and 
discuss why the D.C. Circuit should not have abstained in Nashiri. 
Part V analyzes the detrimental effects of the Supreme Court’s 
refusal to hear Bahlul and Nashiri. 
 
17. Bahlul v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 313 (Mem) (2017); Al-Nashiri v. 
Trump, 138 S.Ct. 354 (Mem) (2017). 
18. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Turns Down Guantanamo Detainee’s 





19. See Steven Vladeck (@steve_vladeck), TWITTER (Oct. 13, 2017, 8:08 
AM), https://twitter.com/steve_vladeck/status/918810730215899137 
[https://perma.cc/2PA8-7NNB] (“Even optimistically, Al-Nashiri’s post-
conviction appeal would not return to the D.C. Circuit before 2024.”); 
see also Brief of the National Institute of Military Justice as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of the Petitioner, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri v. Donald 
J. Trump, President of the United States, et al. at 3 (May 31, 2017) 
(No. 16-8966), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/Nashiri-NIMJ-Amicus.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X2TW-BWEG] (noting that al-Nashiri’s case would 
not be resolved until after his appeal returns to the courts in 2024). 
20. See Guantanamo by the Numbers, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (Oct. 10, 2018), 
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/guantanamo-numbers 
[http://perma.cc/8B2N-MSPJ] (“Yearly cost to hold each detainee at 
Guantánamo: More than $10 million. Annual cost to operate 
Guantánamo: Approximately $445 million.”). 
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Finally, in Part VI, I propose that Congress should carve out an 
exception to the Councilman abstention doctrine by adding a 
provision to the 2009 MCA that would require federal courts to 
exercise collateral review over jurisdictional challenges to the military 
commissions. 
Part I:  Military Commissions in the United States 
In the United States, military commissions are military tribunals 
convened to prosecute individuals for “unlawful conduct associated 
with war.”21 On November 13, 2001, President George W. Bush issued 
a military order authorizing the establishment of a military 
commission to try those individuals responsible for the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks.22 Unlike traditional Article III courts, current military 
commissions at Guantánamo Bay are a variety of specialized Article I 
trial courts sanctioned pursuant to the Military Commissions Act 
(MCA) of 200923 (and, previously, the MCA of 2006).24 The tribunals 
may try “alien unprivileged enemy belligerent[s]” that have engaged 
in—or “purposefully and materially supported”—hostilities against 
the United States or its coalition partners.25 The commissions may 
also try such enemy combatants that were members of al Qaeda 
before their capture.26 The MCA expressly enumerates 32 offenses 
that may be tried by a military commission, as long as they were 
“committed in the context of and associated with hostilities.”27  
21. Military Commissions History, Snapshot: Military Commissions in the 
United States, OFF. OF MIL. COMMISSIONS, 
http://www.mc.mil/ABOUTUS/MilitaryCommissionsHistory.aspx 
[http://perma.cc/DYU8-GELD] (last visited Dec. 27, 2017). 
22. Id.; Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2002), reprinted as 
amended in 10 U.S.C. § 801 (2012), available at http://www.mc.mil/ 
Portals/0/MilitaryOrderNov2001.pdf [https://perma.cc/AYU6-CJD5]. 
23. Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, tit. XVIII, 123 
Stat. 2190, 2574–614 (2009). 
24. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3(a)(1), 120 
Stat. 2600, 2623–24 (formerly codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950j(b)). 
25. How Military Commissions Work, OFF. OF MIL. COMMISSIONS 
http://www.mc.mil/ABOUTUS.aspx. [https://perma.cc/W3F4-7WMJ] 
(last visited Dec. 27, 2017). 
26. Id. 
27. Graver, supra note 13 (citing Military Commissions Act). See also 
Recent Case, In re Al-Nashiri: D.C. Circuit Abstains from Adjudicating 
Habeas Petition of Guantanamo Detainee Tried by Military 
Commission, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1249 (Febr. 10, 2017), available at 
https://harvardlawreview.org/2017/02/in-re-al-nashiri-2/ 
[https://perma.cc/H7JP-KMY5] (citing 10 U.S.C. § 950p(c) (2012) 
(“‘Hostilities’” are ‘any conflict subject to the laws of war.’” (citing 10 
U.S.C. § 948a(9))). 
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In the military order, President Bush argued that it would be 
impractical to extend the legal and evidentiary principles traditionally 
applied in federal criminal trials to military commissions.28 Despite 
the Bush Administration’s loud support for its policy of denying 
accused terrorists access to federal courts29—and although enemy 
combatants may be tried by military commission for international war 
crimes30—an enemy combatant is not precluded from prosecution in 
an Article III court.31 President Barack Obama had more faith than 
his predecessor in the competence of Article III courts to try accused 
terrorists, stating that “in contrast to the commission process, our 
Article III federal courts have proven to have an outstanding record of 
 
28. Military Commissions History, supra note 21 (quoting Military Order of 
Nov. 13, 2001, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2002), reprinted as amended in 10 U.S.C. § 
801 (2012), available at 
http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/MilitaryOrderNov2001.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AYU6-CJD5]). 
29. Michal R. Belknap, A Putrid Pedigree: The Bush Administration’s 
Military Tribunals in Historical Perspective, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 433, 
434-35 (2002). 
30. Stephen I. Vladeck, The Long Reach of Guantánamo Bay Military 
Commissions, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/04/ opinion/the-long-reach-of-
guantanamo-bay-military-commissions.html [https://perma.cc/9L39-
4XWT] (“[T]he Supreme Court concluded during World War II that 
[international war crimes] committed by enemy belligerents fell outside 
of the Constitution’s jury-trial protections — which otherwise require 
that all serious crimes be tried in civilian court.”) (referring to Ex Parte 
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942)) (“Congress has explicitly provided, so far 
as it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have 
jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the law of war in 
appropriate cases.”). “[The U.S. Constitution] cannot be taken to have 
extended the right to demand a jury to trials by military commission, or 
to have required that offenses against the law of war not triable by jury 
at common law be tried only in the civil courts.”  Id. at 40.  
31. In fact, far more terrorists have been successfully convicted in U.S. 
federal civilian courts than in military commissions. Between September 
11, 2001 and December 31, 2016, Article III courts prosecuted and 
convicted at least 549 people for terror-related charges, while military 
commissions have secured only 8 convictions—three of which have since 
been overturned or dismissed. David Kris, Law Enforcement as a 
Counterintelligence Tool, LAWFARE (Mar. 6, 2018, 1:00 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/law-enforcement-counterintelligence-tool 
[http://perma.cc/43KE-8NUZ] (citing U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY and U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EXECUTIVE ORDER 13780: 
PROTECTING THE NATION FROM FOREIGN TERRORIST ENTRY INTO THE 
UNITED STATES INITIAL SECTION 11 REPORT, 2 (2018), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/ press-release/file/1026436/download 
[https://perma.cc/L5MA-PMPV]). 
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convicting some of the most hardened terrorists.”32 The commissions 
have been the subject of widespread criticism, and are largely 
considered to be a “failed experiment”33 and an “almost-unmitigated 
catastrophe.”34 Still, more than sixteen years after President Bush 
first established them, military commissions at Guantánamo remain 
operational—and the doors do not appear to be closing anytime 
soon.35 
Part II:  Bahlul v. United States 
Broadly, Bahlul is illustrative of a judicial system built to shunt 
detainee structural challenges to its authority. More narrowly, Bahlul 
matters to our inquiry because the case challenged the commissions’ 
constitutional authority to charge non-law-of-war offenses. Because 
the government has become disturbingly comfortable bringing such 
 
32. President Barrack H. Obama, Remarks by the President on Plan to 
Close the Prison at Guantanamo Bay, The White House Office of the 




33. Amy Davidson Sorkin, At Guantánamo, Are Even the Judges Giving 
Up?, THE NEW YORKER (Feb. 20, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/at-guantanamo-are-
even-the-judges-giving-up [https://perma.cc /7HMD-DJTV] (quoting 
Rick Kammen, former “learned counsel” of Nashiri’s defense team). 
34. Kris, supra note 31.  
35. In his first State of the Union address, President Donald Trump 
announced his commitment to keeping the Guantánamo military 
detention facility open indefinitely. He subsequently signed an Executive 
Order codifying that commitment. Julian Borger, Donald Trump Signs 
Executive Order to Keep Guantánamo Bay Open, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 
30, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2018/jan/30/guantanamo-bay-trump-signs-executive-order-to-
keep-prison-open [https://perma.cc/DKD4-N9WC]. Military 
commissions at Guantánamo show no signs of slowing themselves. 
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and other defendants charged with crimes 
connected to the 9/11 terrorist attacks are slated to be tried in 2019 at 
the earliest. Carol Rosenberg, 9/11 Prosecutors Propose 2019 Trial 
Date, But Judge Says Not So Fast, MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 24, 2017, 8:38 
AM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news /nation-
world/world/americas/guantanamo/article169047262.html 
[https://perma.cc/272B-V5X7]. In February 2018, the Pentagon fired 
the commissions’ convening authority Henry Rishikof, who was 
reportedly engaged in negotiations for plea deals—which would have 
eliminated the prospect of a protracted trial—with the 9/11 defendants. 
Charlie Savage, Before Firing, Tribunal Official Was Exploring Plea 
Deal to End 9/11 Case, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/10/us/politics/guantanamo-sept-11-
rishikof.html [https://perma.cc/GM32-63BD].  
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charges against military commission defendants, the claims Bahlul 
raised will almost certainly be recycled by future defendants—and will 
almost certainly be delayed by the abstention precedent established in 
Nashiri. 
A. Bahlul Procedural History 
In 2001, Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul was found and 
captured in Pakistan.36 In 2002, United States forces brought Bahlul 
to Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.37 The Bahlul case slowly snaked its way 
up and down the military tribunal and federal appeals court processes 
for more than thirteen years in the period from 2004—when Bahlul 
was first charged by military commission at Guantánamo38—to 2017, 
when the Supreme Court denied his writ of certiorari and concluded 
his case at long last.39  
Initially, in February 2008, Bahlul was charged for three offenses 
under the 2006 MCA: conspiracy to commit war crimes, providing 
material support for terrorism, and solicitation of others to commit 
war crimes.40 The prosecution alleged that through his work for al 
Qaeda, Bahlul had conspired and solicited others to commit seven 
object crimes enumerated in the 2006 MCA: murder of protected 
persons, murder in violation of the law of war, attacking civilians, 
attacking civilian objects, terrorism, providing material support for 
terrorism, and destruction of property in violation of the law of war.41 
Bahlul boycotted his commission’s proceedings and ordered his 
counsel not to participate—not even to present a defense.42 The 
commission convicted him on all three counts in November of that 
year,43 finding that he had conspired to commit and solicited all seven 
alleged object offenses, and actually committed ten additional 
prohibited overt acts.44 Bahlul was sentenced to serve the rest of his 
 
36. Graver, supra note 13. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Bahlul v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 313 (Mem) (2017). See also Ram 
Eachambadi, Supreme Court denies review in conviction of Bin Laden’s 
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life in prison.45 While the case may seem uncomplicated on its face,46 
it raised a serious legal question for both his military commission and 
subsequent federal appellate court panels to grapple with: whether 
there are constitutional requirements, arising out of Article III, 
imposed on military commissions.47 
Bahlul pushed this question as far as the federal appeals process 
would allow. After losing at trial, he appealed his three-charge 
conviction to the Court of Military Commission Review in January 
2010.48 That chamber affirmed his conviction on all counts in 
September 2011.49 From there, Bahlul took his case to federal court in 
accordance with the 2006 MCA.50 
In 2012, Bahlul appealed the CMCR decision to the D.C. Circuit51 
in a case that would come to be known as Al Bahlul I.52 Among other 
claims, Bahlul asserted that his conviction violated a number of 
constitutional guarantees.53 First, he argued that his conviction 
violated the Constitution’s Articles I and III because the government 
had charged him with offenses that could only be heard by an Article 
III court.54 Second, Bahlul asserted that the Ex Post Facto clause 
protected him from being charged under the 2006 MCA because that 
statute came into force after his capture.55 Finally, he contended that 
his conviction violated the equal protection guarantees of the Due 
Process Clause because the commissions are themselves “a segregated 
form of justice in violation of the Fifth Amendment.”56 
While Bahlul I was pending in the D.C. Circuit, a panel of that 
same court issued an opinion in Hamdan v. United States (Hamdan 
II).57 In that case, the court found that the 2006 MCA did not allow 
 
45. Id. 
46. Sliney, supra note 11. 
47. Peter Margulies, Justice at War: Military Tribunals and Article III, 49 
U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 305, 362 (2015).  
48. Graver, supra note 13. 
49. Id. 
50. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, 
2622 (formerly codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950(g) (“[T]he [D.C. Circuit] shall 
have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of a final judgment 
rendered by a military commission.”). 
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the commissions to prosecute offenses committed before the statute 
was enacted unless the offenses charged already constituted war 
crimes triable by military commission under existing domestic law.58 
The government subsequently appealed Bahlul I to the full D.C. 
Circuit, conceding that the court would have to vacate Bahlul’s 
convictions if the Hamdan II holding stayed in force.59 
In July 2014, the government got its wish. A full panel of the 
D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, overruled the previous three-judge 
panel’s Hamdan II decision in a case known as Bahlul II.60 The en 
banc panel then turned its attention to the merits of Bahlul’s case. 
The court applied a plain error standard of review61 because Bahlul 
had forfeited a number of claims by refusing to raise them while 
boycotting his trial.62 On plain error review, the panel did away with 
two of Bahlul’s three convictions.63 First, the court found that 
providing material support for terrorism was not a violation of the 
laws of war triable by military commission at the time Bahlul 
committed that act.64 Second, the panel determined that soliciting 
others to commit war crimes was simply not an offense triable by 
military commission at all.65 
After the panel overturned his solicitation and material support 





61. Typically, a party who fails to preserve an argument before a lower 
tribunal is barred from raising it on appeal “absent plain error or 
exceptional circumstances.” Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1, 9 
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (citing United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 
157, 159 (1936)) (also citing Salazar ex rel. Salazar v. Dist. of Columbia, 
602 F.3d 431, 437 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). “A plain error is “[1] an ‘error’ [2] 
that is ‘plain’ and [3] that ‘affect[s] substantial rights.’” Id. at 9-10 
(citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (quoting Fed. 
R. Crim P. 52(b)). “If all three conditions are met, an appellate court 
may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if [4] 
the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings.” Id. at 9 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 
U.S. 461, 467 (1997)). The 2009 MCA further restricts the exercise of 
plain error review of military commissions, stating that the court of 
appeals may only correct an error that “materially prejudices the 
substantial rights of the accused.” 10 U.S.C § 950a. 
62. Graver, supra note 13. 
63. Episode 35: Will This Be the Year of Military Courts at the Supreme 
Court?, THE NATIONAL SECURITY LAW PODCAST (Sept. 12, 2017) 
(downloaded using iTunes); Graver, supra note 13. 
64. Bahlul, 767 F.3d at 29. 
65. Id. at 30-31. 
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conviction for conspiracy to commit war crimes. The problem? 
Inchoate conspiracy to violate the law of war is not, by itself, a 
traditional violation of the law of war triable by military 
commission.66 As such, the conspiracy charge presented the stickiest 
legal question before the court: Can military commissions prosecute 
domestic, non-international war crimes—such as inchoate 
conspiracy—without violating the Constitution?67 The answer to that 
question depended—and continues to depend—not on a reading of the 
MCA or any other statute, but on the federal courts’ basic 
constitutional authority to try domestic offenses that are not also 
violations of the laws of war.68 
The D.C. Circuit en banc panel remanded the question of whether 
the government may charge conspiracy—without violating either 
Article I or Article III of the Constitution—to a traditional three-
judge panel of that court.69 In June 2015—in Bahlul III70—those three 
judges took the question under de novo review because the claim 
constituted a “structural” challenge to the commissions “that [could] 
not be forfeited.”71 Bahlul argued that as a criminal defendant, he had 
an Article III right to be prosecuted before a civilian jury in federal 
court.72 Certainly, inchoate conspiracy to commit a war crime charges 
can be brought in an Article III trial court.73 In fact, as Chief Judge 
Merrick Garland pointed out at oral argument, such charges are 
brought every day.74 What then, he asked, is the justification “for 
using a military commission rather than an Article III court?”75 
 
66. Martin S. Lederman, Of Spies, Saboteurs, and Enemy Accomplices: 
History’s Lessons for the Constitutionality of Wartime Military 
Tribunals, 105 GEO. L.J. 1529, 1536 (2017). 
67. Episode 35: Will This Be the Year of Military Courts at the Supreme 
Court?, supra note 63. 
68. Id. 
69. Graver, supra note 13. 
70. Al Bahlul v. United States, 792 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
71. Id. at 3. 
72. Helen Klein Murillo and Alex Loomis, A Summary of the Al Bahlul 
Decision, LAWFARE (Oct. 21, 2016), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/summary-al-bahlul-decision 
[https://perma.cc/5GM2-76QX]. 
73. Marty Lederman, Reflections from the En Banc Al Bahlul Oral 
Argument, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 1, 2015), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/28037/reflections-en-banc-al-bahlul-oral-
argument/ [https://perma.cc/EDZ6-YHGY].  
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
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The panel divided, but ultimately vacated Bahlul’s conspiracy 
charge on the basis that it did, in fact, violate Article III of the 
Constitution.76 The judges determined that the scope of offenses 
triable by military commission “does not extend to the trial of 
domestic crimes in general, or inchoate conspiracy in particular,”77 
and overturned Bahlul’s conviction on the grounds that “Congress 
cannot encroach upon the Article III judicial power by authorizing 
military commissions to try unlawful enemy combatants for 
conspiracy.”78 Moving forward, commissions would be limited to 
trying international law of war violations,79 and conspiracy only falls 
within that category when committed in the context of genocide.80 
The government petitioned the D.C. Circuit for a rehearing en 
banc of the issues presented in Bahlul III.81 The court agreed, and the 
full court heard Bahlul’s case one final time (this time, as Bahlul 
IV).82 In October 2016, the en banc panel vacated the three-judge 
panel’s 2015 holding that Bahlul’s conspiracy charge violated Article 
III of the Constitution.83 In doing so, they upheld Bahlul’s conviction 
for inchoate conspiracy and corresponding life sentence.84 The judges 
published a number of opinions, and no particular opinion received 
the backing of a majority of the court.85 The court divided with 
regard to what constituted the proper standard of review,86 and also 
as to whether Congress has Article I power to make conspiracy triable 
 
76. Graver, supra note 13. See also Michael Doyle, Federal Appeals Court 
Sets Aside Conviction of Bin Laden Assistant, MIAMI HERALD, 
http://www. miamiherald.com/news/nation-
world/world/americas/guantanamo/article 
23853043.html#storylink=cpy [https://perma.cc/Z2HJ-XSKS] (last 
updated June 12, 2015 at 9:06 PM). 
77. Doyle, supra note 76.  
78. Murillo & Loomis, supra note 72; Al Bahlul v. United States, 792 F.3d 
1, 3-4 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
79. Murillo & Loomis, supra note 72. 
80. Id. 
81. Wells Bennett, The United States Seeks En Banc Rehearing in Al-
Bahlul, LAWFARE (July 27, 2015, 2:25 PM), 
https://lawfareblog.com/united-states-seeks-en-banc-rehearing-al-bahlul 
[https://perma.cc/PH8X-H2K8].  
82. Graver, supra note 13. 
83. Id. 
84. See id. 
85. Episode 35: Will This Be the Year of Military Courts at the Supreme 
Court?, supra note 63; see also Graver, supra note 13. 
86. Graver, supra note 13. 
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by military commission.87 Of the six-judge majority, only four judges 
agreed that it does.88 A fifth judge affirmed the conviction on the 
basis of plain error review but declined to reach the constitutional 
question.89 The sixth and final judge to join the majority concluded 
that, in practice, Bahlul was convicted of substantive war crimes in 
connection with the 9/11 attacks; conspiracy was only the theory of 
liability of the crime.90 Therefore, he concluded, the constitutional 
question was not invoked. Three judges dissented; two others 
recused.91 Bahlul’s only remaining recourse was a writ of certiorari to 
the Supreme Court, which was denied in October 2017.92 His 
conviction had survived his weighty challenges, and his life sentence 
was ultimately upheld. 
B. International vs. Domestic Offenses: What is Conspiracy? 
Fairly quickly into Bahlul’s post-conviction appeals process, 
conspiracy became the charge of interest for courts and legal 
spectators alike.93 Two different scenarios can give rise to a conspiracy 
charge, and the circumstances differ greatly under domestic versus 
international law.94 First, under United States domestic law, if an 
individual agrees—with others—to commit a crime, and then takes 
even a small step toward the completion of that agreement or crime, 
then that individual can be charged with conspiracy.95 This was the 
charge levied against Bahlul. 
Charging a person with conspiracy under international law is 
more complicated.96 International law only permits conspiracy charges 
against people who engage in plots that result in completed and 
 
87. Id. 




92. Bahlul v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 313 (Mem) (2017). 
93. See, e.g., Wells C. Bennett, Oral Argument in Al Bahlul: Judge Tatel 
and Quirin Dicta, LAWFARE (Oct. 22, 2014, 7:24 PM), 
https://lawfareblog.com/oral-argument-al-bahlul-judge-tatel-and-quirin-
dicta [https://perma.cc/EV8F-LSUP] (discussing Judge Tatel’s 
discussion of the holding in Ex Parte Quirin and what it means for 
“whether the jurisdiction of a Guantanamo military commission 
constitutionally may include only international offenses, or both 
international as well as domestic ones”).   
94. Margulies, supra note 47, at 368. 
95. Id. at 368-69. 
96. Id. 
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unlawful acts of violence—such as murder.97 An international tribunal 
will not consider a plot (or even an agreement) as a war crime in the 
absence of a completed act.98 Further, international criminal tribunals 
will not charge a person with conspiracy for only plotting to kill 
civilians unless the defendant’s plan facilitates or otherwise aids 
another person committing that murder.99 Thus, under international 
law, “conspiracy is not a crime in and of itself.”100 Instead, it is simply 
the theory of responsibility that supports a murder charge.101 This 
theory is grounded in the idea that a person who plans a murder is 
just as guilty of the killing as the person who actually commits the 
crime.102 
C. Upholding Bahlul’s Conviction on the Merits 
As noted above, the appellate court’s decision to uphold Bahlul’s 
conspiracy conviction was not a clean one.103 In response to his final 
appeal to that court in Bahlul IV, the D.C. Circuit—sitting en banc—
splintered in its October 2016 decision regarding his Article III 
claim.104 Although a six-judge majority of the court upheld Bahlul’s 
conviction for standalone conspiracy, those in the majority varied in 
their reasoning.105 Despite the court’s inability to sign onto a majority 
decision, little doubt remained about the importance of answering the 
most important question at bar: whether it is constitutional for 
military commissions at Guantánamo to try defendants for domestic 
defenses like inchoate conspiracy.106 
In the first footnote of the principle concurring opinion, then 
Judge Brett Kavanaugh emphasized the need for a final judgement on 
the merits of Bahlul’s claim. “The question of whether conspiracy 
may constitutionally be tried by military commission,” he wrote, “is 
 
97. Id. at 368. 
98. Id. at 369. 
99. Id.  
100. Id. at 368. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. See generally Episode 35: Will This Be the Year of Military Courts at 
the Supreme Court?, supra note 63. 
104. Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman Al Bahlul v. United States, 840 F.3d 757 
(D.C. Cir. 2016). 
105. Id. 
106. Steve Vladeck, Why the Supreme Court Should Take the Two New 
Guantánamo Military Commission Appeals, JUST SECURITY (May 31, 
2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/41548/supreme-court-guantanamo-
military-commission-appeals/ [https://perma.cc/HBR7-5BJF]. 
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extraordinarily important and deserves a ‘definitive answer.’”107 Not 
only does it “[implicate] an important part of the U.S. Government’s 
war strategy,” it implicates other cases that challenge convictions for 
standalone domestic offenses by military commission.108 Bahlul’s case, 
Kavanaugh penned, “unfortunately has been pending in this Court for 
more than five years. It is long past time for us to resolve the issue 
squarely and definitively.”109 Prominent scholars, including the 
University of Texas at Austin School of Law professor and national 
security law scholar Stephen Vladeck, agreed. “At some point, 
wouldn’t resolution of the Article III question actually be useful for 
the military commissions (and not just for we who write about 
them)?” If not, Vladeck asks, “is this all just an elaborate game to 
play out the string — and, as such, a waste of a whole lot of time, 
energy, and judicial resources?”110 
Writing the principal concurrence for the full D.C. Circuit, then 
Judge Kavanaugh espoused a number of justifications for upholding 
Bahlul’s conviction on the merits.111 He noted that Congress’s war 
powers give it vast authority to establish military commissions112 
without “impos[ing] international law as a constraint on Congress’s 
authority to make offenses triable by [those commissions].”113 Doing 
so, he rejected Bahlul’s argument that “Congress and the President 
[are] subject to the dictates of the international community” as a 
matter of U.S. constitutional law.114 
Next, Kavanaugh pointed to the holding of Ex parte Quirin, in 
which the Supreme Court upheld military commission convictions for 
espionage.115 In Quirin, the Court did not expressly limit commissions 
to trying international law offenses.116 Kavanaugh drew a connection 
between Bahlul’s conspiracy conviction and the Quirin espionage 
convictions on the basis that—similar to inchoate conspiracy—
 
107. Bahlul, 840 F.3d at 760 n.1 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (citing Al 
Bahlul v. United States, 767 F. 3d 1, 62, 412 U.S. App. D.C. 372 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014) (en banc) (separate opinion of Brown, J.)). 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Stephen Vladeck, Counting to Six in Al Bahlul IX, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 
1, 2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/28042/counting-al-bahlul-iv/ 
[https://perma.cc/YPD4-FAAT]. 
111. Murillo & Loomis, supra note 72. 
112. Bahlul, 840 F.3d at 761. 
113. Id.  
114. Id. at 763. 
115. 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
116. Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman Al Bahlul v. United States, 840 F.3d 757, 
770 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
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espionage is not “an offense under the international law of war.”117 
Further, he claimed that Quirin itself was a valid military commission 
prosecution for conspiracy, asserting that “[t]he two most important 
military commission precedents in U.S. history—the trials of the 
Lincoln conspirators and the Nazi saboteurs [Quirin]—were 
[themselves] trials for the offense of conspiracy.”118 
Finally, Kavanaugh made two historical arguments to support the 
plurality’s position. He wrote that historically, international law did 
not constrain Congress’s ability to  make certain offenses triable by 
military commission, pointing out that U.S. military tribunals have 
prosecuted non-international law crimes (such as espionage and aiding 
the enemy) since 1776.119 Finally, Kavanaugh argued that Bahlul’s 
conviction does not violate Article III because jury trials were not 
guaranteed in military commissions as a matter of historical 
practice.120 
D. The End of the Road: The Supreme Court Denies Certiorari in 
Bahlul 
In 2017, after the full en banc D.C. Circuit reinstated Bahlul’s 
conspiracy conviction, he filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with 
the Supreme Court of the United States.121 In his petition, Bahlul 
articulated three claims.122 First, Bahlul asked, “May Congress vest 
these military commissions with federal courts’ jurisdiction over 
wholly domestic crimes?”123 
Second, Bahlul raised two ex post facto claims.124 The first was 
statutory; the second, constitutional. The statutory question he 
presented was: “Does the text of the 2006 MCA overcome the 
presumption against retroactivity to authorize prosecutions for 
conduct committed before its enactment?”125 The constitutional 
question regarding the ex post facto claims was more important.126 
 
117. Id. at 763. 
118. Id. at 766. 
119. Id. at 765. 
120. Murillo & Loomis, supra note 72. 
121. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman Al Bahlul v. 
U.S., 840 F.3d 757 (2016) (No. 16-1307).  
122. Id. at ii. 
123. Id. at 14. 
124. Graver, supra note 13. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
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Bahlul asked: “Assuming the 2006 MCA authorizes such prosecutions, 
is this kind of arrangement constitutional?”127 
Third, Bahlul wrapped up his certiorari petition with an equal 
protection claim.128 He asserted that by limiting the commissions’ 
jurisdiction to non-citizens, Congress had effectively created a 
“segregated justice system in violation of the Fifth Amendment.”129 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court declined to answer the call to 
resolve the statutory and constitutional questions Bahlul presented 
it.130 This denial of certiorari—when combined with the D.C. Circuit’s 
fractured rejection of Bahlul’s constitutional challenges in Bahlul IV—
leaves the Article III puzzle largely unsolved.131 Technically, due to 
the D.C. Circuit’s inability to reach an authoritative conclusion, the 
2011 Court of Military Commission Review merits decision remains 
controlling on the issues,132 notwithstanding the fact that none of the 
D.C. Circuit opinions issued affirmed on the basis of the CMCR’s 
reasoning.133 
On October 16, 2017—six days after the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari to Bahlul134—it denied certiorari to Nashiri, too.135 The 
Court’s denial in each case is individually unfortunate. In confluence, 
however, both denials together brewed a perfect storm that will have 
detrimental effects on the military commissions system for years—if 
not decades—to come. 
Part III:  Nashiri v. Trump 
Abd al-Rahim Al-Nashiri is a Saudi Arabian citizen who has been 
charged with planning the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole off the coast of 
Yemen in October 2000136—approximately eleven months before the 
9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City. He is also 
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Limburg in 2002.137 Nashiri was captured in 2002,138 and a military 
commission was convened at Guantánamo Bay in 2011 to try him for 
his role in the attack on the U.S.S. Cole.139 
It is important to note that although his commission has been 
constituted, Nashiri has not yet been tried.140 As such, his attempts to 
challenge his tribunal’s jurisdiction over him were executed 
exclusively through pretrial motions.141 Both the substance and the 
pretrial nature of Nashiri’s claims will ultimately impact our analysis 
here. More importantly, they underline the significance of the 
Supreme Court’s denial of his claims. 
Nashiri’s coordinated bombing of the U.S.S. Cole and other 
vessels more closely resembles an international war crime triable by 
military commission than Bahlul’s work as bin Laden’s media man.142 
Although the commissions charged both men with conspiracy, the 
case against Nashiri is stronger than it was against Bahlul for two 
reasons. 
First, Nashiri’s conspiracy charge is connected to the commission 
of overt acts—including his attacks on the U.S.S. Cole and French 
supertanker M/V Limburg. Therefore, it qualifies as an international 
law of war offense under the MCA and is triable by military 
commission.143 Bahlul, on the other hand, was charged with inchoate 
conspiracy not connected to a completed act.144 Traditionally, 
inchoate conspiracy was not considered an international law of war 
offense triable by military commission (D.C. Circuit 2015 en banc 
decision notwithstanding).145 
 
137. Graver, supra note 13. 
138. Id. 
139. Recent Case, supra note 27, at 1250 (citing In re Al-Nashiri, 835 F.3d 
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140. Episode 35: Will This Be the Year of Military Courts at the Supreme 
Court?, supra note 63. 
141. Id.  
142. Vladeck, Why the Supreme Court Should Take the Two New 
Guantánamo Military Commission Appeals, supra note 106. 
143. Robert Chesney, Military Commission Charges Referred Against Al-
Nashiri, LAWFARE (Sept. 28, 2011, 2:19 PM), 
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Second, Nashiri is also charged with additional law-of-war offenses 
enumerated in the MCA.146 His additional charges include using 
treachery or perfidy,147 murder in violation of the law of war,148 
terrorism,149 intentionally causing serious bodily injury,150 attacking 
civilians,151 attacking civilian objects,152 and hazarding a vessel.153 
Because Nashiri’s tribunal has clear jurisdiction over these additional 
offenses, the constitutionality of a commission prosecuting him for 
conspiracy will not make or break his case the way it did for Bahlul. 
Perhaps because his conviction does not hang on the validity of a 
conspiracy charge, Nashiri raises a different subject-matter 
jurisdictional challenge than Bahlul did. The substantive question in 
Nashiri is whether the MCA empowers—and the Constitution 
allows—military commissions to try war crimes not committed within 
the context of armed conflict with the United States.154 Stated 
otherwise, “at the time that [Nashiri] was involved in the bombing of 
the U.S.S. Cole in October 2000,” was the United States “at war with 
al Qaeda such that the laws of war applied and a military commission 
was authorized?”155 
After his arrest, Nashiri filed a motion with his commission, 
arguing that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction to try him under this 
framework.156 The bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, he submitted, was not 
committed “in the context of and associated with hostilities”157 
between the United States and al Qaeda158 because it occurred before 
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143; 10 U.S.C. § 950t(23). 
154. Episode 35: Will This Be the Year of Military Courts at the Supreme 
Court?, supra note 63. 
155. Id. 
156. Graver, supra note 13. 
157. Recent Case, supra note 27, at 1249-50; see also 10 U.S.C. § 948a(9) 
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operations in Yemen in September 2003, arguing that was the first time 
and place the president ‘extend[ed] the AUMF’s war-making authorities’ 
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the 9/11 attacks in New York. Since the United States was not 
engaged with al Qaeda before 9/11, Nashiri contends his tribunal 
lacks jurisdiction to charge him under the MCA for acts committed in 
that timeframe.159 
Nashiri then went above his commission to contest its jurisdiction 
to try him based on these arguments. He filed a writ of habeas corpus 
with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia160 
and a petition for a writ of mandamus with the D.C. Circuit.161 The 
mandamus petition challenged the way judges are assigned to the 
Court of Military Commission Review, which will be the first court to 
hear Nashiri’s appeal if his military commission convicts him.162 The 
panel denied mandamus relief, 163 largely on the basis that Nashiri 
retains the right to challenge the CMCR’s panel composition on post-
 
as recognized in a War Powers Resolution report. If this date is correct, 
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conviction appeal,164 and because his claim for relief was not “clear 
and indisputable.”165 More importantly, Nashiri’s habeas petition was 
rejected166 on the basis that Councilman abstention167—an abstention 
doctrine unique to military tribunals—militates against federal court 
review of Nashiri’s claims until he brings them on post-conviction 
appeal.168 
Less than a week after it denied certiorari in Bahlul, the Supreme 
Court declined to hear Nashiri’s case. As a result, Nashiri’s 
proceedings have continued in anticipation of his eventual trial at 
Guantánamo, and he is barred from re-challenging his commission’s 
jurisdiction until after he is—presumably—convicted.169 
Part IV:  Councilman Abstention 
A. So, What is Councilman Abstention? 
Abstention doctrines are Supreme Court doctrines that permit—
or in some cases, require—federal courts to decline to hear a case if 
doing so would encroach upon another court’s power to resolve it.170 
These doctrines are typically named after the Supreme Court cases in 
which they were conceived.171 
The Supreme Court developed the Councilman abstention 
doctrine in the 1975 case Councilman v. Schlesinger.172 In 
Councilman, an Army captain was court-martialed for possessing 
marijuana.173  The Court determined that it was proper for the federal 
courts system to abstain from hearing the captain’s collateral 
challenges until after the court-martial proceedings had run their 
 
164. Vladeck, supra note 162. 
165. Id. (quoting In re Al-Nashiri, 791 F.3d at 85-86). 
166. Episode 35: Will This Be the Year of Military Courts at the Supreme 
Court?, supra note 63. 
167. See generally Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975) (discussing 
the jurisdiction of military courts and court-martial proceedings). 
168. Id. See also Episode 35: Will This Be the Year of Military Courts at the 
Supreme Court?, supra note 63. (discussing Nashiri’s claims and 
potential appeal). 
169. Episode 35: Will This Be the Year of Military Courts at the Supreme 
Court?, supra note 63. 
170. See generally JOSEPH G. COOK & JOHN L. SOBIESKI, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS 
ACTIONS ¶ 3.02 (2018), available at 
https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink /7642f39c-983d-4528-b240-
3b6dc9bd2ae6/?context=1000516 (discussing the various doctrines, 
requirements, and defenses of abstention). 
171. Id. 
172. 420 U.S. 738. 
173. Id. at 739. 
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course.174 As a broader doctrine, Councilman stands for the mandate 
that civilian courts should not review habeas petitions until a military 
proceeding concludes its inquiry.175 Conceptually, it is based on “two 
considerations of comity that together favor abstention,”176 which the 
Court addressed in depth in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. 
In defining the first comity consideration, the Hamdan Court 
noted that military discipline—as it contributes to the smooth 
operation of the Armed Services overall—is best served when civilian 
courts refrain from interfering in the military justice system.177 
The second consideration stems from the Court’s observation that 
the military justice system already includes civilian judges removed 
from military control and influence.178 By designing the system in this 
way, the Court thought Congress had struck an appropriate balance 
between institutional military interests and those of individual service 
members.179 Federal courts, the Supreme Court concluded, should 
respect this balance.180 The Court was confident that the procedural 
safeguards Congress wrote into the military justice system would 
protect servicemen’s constitutional rights,181 and would justify 
abstention for the duration of ongoing courts-martial proceedings. 
B. Councilman Abstention Should Not Extend to Military Commissions 
The D.C. Circuit determined that the Councilman abstention 
doctrine prevented Nashiri from bringing pretrial challenges to his 
 
174. Id. at 759-60. 
175. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Bar Association in Support of 
Petitioner at 6, al-Nashiri v. Trump, et al., 138 S.Ct. 354 (2017) (No. 
16-8966) (citing Councilman, 420 U.S. at 759). 
176. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 586 (2006); see also Obaydullah v. 
Obama, 609 F.3d 444, 448 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (discussing the two 
considerations as mentioned in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld). 
177. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 586 (citing Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 
738, 752 (1975)) (“[M]ilitary discipline and, therefore, the efficient 
operation of the Armed Forces are best served if the military justice 
system acts without regular interference from civilian courts.”). 
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. (quoting Councilman, 420 U.S. at 758) (“[F]ederal courts should 
respect the balance that Congress struck between military preparedness 
and fairness to individual service members when it created ‘an 
integrated system of military courts and review procedures, a critical 
element of which is the Court of Military Appeals consisting of civilian 
judges completely removed from all military influence or persuasion . . . 
.’”). 
181. Id. (quoting Councilman, 420 U.S. at 758). 
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commission’s jurisdiction over him.182 In other words, the court 
elected not to exercise its power of review over Nashiri’s claims until 
he raises them on post-conviction appeal. This decision was misguided 
at best. Broadening Councilman abstention to apply to military 
commissions is not just detrimental as a matter of social policy; it is 
unjustified in light of the Court’s own basis for establishing and 
upholding the doctrine in the first place. 
In Nashiri, the D.C. Circuit conceded that Councilman requires 
federal courts to have confidence in both “the adequacy of the 
alternative system in protecting the rights of defendants” and “the 
importance of the interests served by allowing that system to proceed 
uninterrupted by federal courts” in order to abstain.183 That they 
found this confidence in the military commissions is remarkable. 
Certainly, abstention makes sense in the context of trials by courts-
martial, which invoke both of Councilman’s mandatory 
“considerations of comity.”184 Unlike courts-martial, however, 
collateral pre-trial review of the Guantánamo commissions does not 
implicate either comity considerations underlying Councilman.185 
i. The First “Consideration of Comity” Does Not Apply to Military 
Commissions 
The first “consideration of comity”—that military justice is best 
served when federal courts do not get involved—does not apply in 
military commission cases because concerns about military discipline 
are irrelevant when the defendant is not a member of the Armed 
Services.186 None of the Guantánamo military commission defendants, 
including Nashiri and Bahlul, are members of the U.S. Armed 
Services. As such, the first comity consideration is plainly not invoked 
in their cases.  
182. Episode 35: Will This Be the Year of Military Courts at the Supreme 
Court?, supra note 63. 
183. In re Al-Nashiri, 835 F.3d 110, 121 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
184. See Brief of the National Institute of Military Justice as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of the Petitioner at 5-15, al-Nashiri v. Trump, et al. (2017) 
(No. 16-8966) (quoting Hamdan, 548 at 586) (discussing the Councilman 
abstention doctrine) [hereinafter Brief 16-8966]; see also Brief of the 
National Institute of Military Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
the Petitioner at 3-8, In re al-Nashiri, 835 F.3d 110 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 
(Nos. 15-1023, 15-5020) (quoting Hamdan, 548 at 586) (discussing 
Councilman abstention doctrine) [hereinafter Brief 15-1023]. 
185. Brief 15-1023, supra note 184, at 3-4 
186. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 587 (2006) (“[The detainee] is not a 
member of our Nation’s Armed Forces, so concerns about military 
discipline do not apply.”); see also Obaydullah v. Obama, 609 F.3d 444, 
448 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting that circumstances are entirely different 
between an ongoing court-martial of a military service member and a 
potential future military commission trial of an alien detainee). 
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ii. The Second “Consideration of Comity” Does Not Apply to Military 
Commissions 
The second “consideration of comity”—that federal courts should 
respect the balance Congress created between military institutional 
interests and service member individual interests—does not apply for 
two reasons. 
First, unlike the court-martial at issue in Councilman, military 
commissions are subservient to, and not separate from, Article III 
federal courts.187 The MCA gives Article III courts direct review over 
questions of law arising out of military commissions.188 Abstention 
achieves nothing in this context because both the military 
commissions and the Court of Military Commission Review ultimately 
answer to the D.C. Circuit anyway.189 And, unlike other commonly-
applied abstention doctrines—many of which allow State courts to 
reach an initial conclusion despite ultimately being subject to 
Supreme Court review—abstention in the military commission 
context cannot be justified on the basis of federalism. 
When the Court decided Councilman v. Schlesinger, federal courts 
did not have jurisdiction to review courts-martial decisions.190 The 
court-martial decision at issue was only reviewable by higher military 
tribunals; as a civilian court, the Supreme Court lacked the power of 
review it maintains over modern commissions.191 By abstaining from 
courts-martial cases, civilian courts of the Councilman era rightfully 
declined to intervene in an entirely separate trial and appellate court 
structure from the Article III court system.192 
Modern military commissions are not separate from civilian courts 
in the way courts-martial were in Councilman’s time.193 The 
commissions are therefore “directly subservient” to civilian federal 
courts,194 and the D.C. Circuit has mandatory, supervisory jurisdiction 
over appeals arising out of them.195 This jurisdiction includes the right  
187. Brief 15-1023, supra note 184, at 3-8. 
188. Id. at 4-5. 
189. Id. at 4-5 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 950g (2006)). 
190. Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 746 (1975) (“Congress [has 
not] conferred on any Art. III court jurisdiction directly to review court-
martial determinations. The valid, final judgments of military courts, 
like those of any court of competent jurisdiction not subject to direct 
review for errors of fact or law, have res judicata effect and preclude 
further litigation of the merits.”). 
191. Brief 16-8966, supra note 184, at 10. 
192. Id. at 11. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. at 10. 
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to review any and all questions of law that emerge on appeal from the 
Court of Military Commission Review.196 As such, unlike the court-
martial at issue in Councilman v. Schlesinger, the D.C. Circuit’s 
determinations in military commission cases are expressly binding 
upon the commissions themselves.197 
Second, one could dispute how well Congress actually struck a 
balance between fairness and military preparedness when it enacted 
the MCA.198 This is largely due to lingering questions about whether 
Guantánamo defendants receive Bill of Rights protections, the D.C. 
Circuit’s inability to reach a consensus on the legal questions in 
Bahlul,199 and the commissions’ reluctance to self-correct in 
accordance with Supreme Court expectations of the military justice 
system.200 
iii. Additional Reasons Councilman Should Not Apply to Military 
Commissions 
Perhaps because the first comity consideration is so blatantly 
inapplicable to military commission trials of non-service members, the 
D.C. Circuit relied heavily on the 2009 MCA—and how it changed 
the Court’s analysis of the second comity consideration—to justify 
abstaining in Nashiri.201 Even if the D.C. Circuit is correct that the 
post-Hamdan 2009 MCA sufficiently tips the scales in favor of 
abstention, other countervailing factors still render the application of 
Councilman to military commissions seriously improper.202 
The D.C. Circuit decided to abstain in Nashiri after concluding 
that the MCA implicitly instructs Article III courts not to review a 
military commission case until the military system has itself wrapped 
up its inquiry.203 While this inference may have held water when 
Congress enacted the original 2006 MCA, the statutory language 
giving rise to this conclusion is no longer in force today. In passing 
 
196. Id. 
197. Id. at 12. 
198. Brief 15-1023, supra note 184, at 5. 
199. Id. (citing Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1, 27–31 (D.C. Cir. 
2014) (en banc)). 
200. Id. (citing United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904 (2009)). 
201. See In re Al-Nashiri, 835 F.3d 110, 125 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“Heeding the 
political branches’ instruction as to the timing of Article III review 
qualifies as an ‘important countervailing interest’ warranting abstention, 
at least where that instruction is based on those branches’ assessment of 
national security needs.”). 
202. Brief 16-8966, supra note 184, at 10. 
203. Id. at 12 (quoting In re Al-Nashiri, 835 F.3d at 124 (emphasis added)). 
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the 2009 MCA, Congress removed the provision of the original act204 
that expressly denied Article III courts collateral review of claims 
challenging military commissions.205 Basic canons of statutory 
interpretation instruct courts to interpret laws and their provisions 
consistent with any subsequent amendments,206 and when two 
statutes (or two versions of one statute) conflict, the more recently-
enacted statute controls.207 As such, federal courts should consider the 
2009 MCA—which does not expressly ban collateral review by civilian 
courts—much more probative of Congressional intent on this issue 
than the 2006 MCA, which could have been read as encouraging 
abstention until that provision was repealed three years later.208 
Further, longstanding Supreme Court doctrine dictates that 
requiring defendants to exhaust military remedies before challenging 
the military’s right to try them in the first place is markedly unfair.209 
The Supreme Court has stated that it would be improper to force a 
 
204. 10 U.S.C. § 950j(b) (2006) (previously enacted as Military Commissions 
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. 2600, 2623–24) 
(“Except as otherwise provided in this chapter and notwithstanding any 
other provision of law . . . no court, justice, or judge shall have 
jurisdiction to hear or consider any claim or cause of action. . . relating 
to the prosecution, trial, or judgment of a military commission under 
this chapter, including challenges to the lawfulness of procedures of 
military commissions under this chapter.”); see also National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 950j, 123 
Stat. 2190, 2605 (demonstrating the removal of 10 U.S.C. § 950j(b)). 
205. Brief 16-8966, supra note 184, at 12. 
206. Judge Russell E. Carparelli, The Rehnquist Court’s Canons of Statutory 
Construction, NCSL.ORG, n. 38 (2005), available at http://www.ncsl.org/ 
documents/lsss/2013pds/rehnquist_court_canons_citations.pdf 
[https:// perma.cc/JA3U-T8YD] (outline derived from William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 
HARV. L. REV. 26 (1994)). (citing Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 149-
51 (1987)). 
207. Often referred to as the “later in time” rule, the Colorado Office of 
Legislative Legal Services describes this canon using the following 
hypothetical: “If [there is] a conflict between two statutory provisions 
and one of the provisions took effect July 1, 2013, and the other took 
effect July 1, 2014, the court will apply the one that took effect in 
2014.” Colorado General Assembly, Commonly Applied Rules of 
Statutory Construction, LEG.COLORADO.GOV, 
https://leg.colorado.gov/agencies/office-legislative-legal-
services/commonly-applied-rules-statutory-construction 
[https://perma.cc/P7SV-5USZ] (last visited Mar. 3, 2018). 
208. Brief 16-8966, supra note 184, at 13. 
209. Id. at 3 (quoting Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, n.8 (1969)) (“[It is] 
especially unfair to require exhaustion of military remedies when the 
complainants raise[] substantial arguments denying the right of the 
military to try them at all.”). 
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defendant who contests the “very authority of the Government to 
hale him into court to face trial on the charge against him” to wait to 
bring those claims on post-conviction appeal.210 In such cases, even a 
future acquittal or reversal cannot adequately remedy the injury a 
defendant suffers by enduring not just a voidable, but a void trial.211 
This injustice is exacerbated for defendants like Nashiri and others 
tried in military commissions for capital crimes.212 If Nashiri is correct 
on the merits of his jurisdictional challenge, he could ultimately be 
put to death following invalid proceedings. The D.C. Circuit’s 
decision to abstain in Nashiri is directly contrary to—and threatens 
to undermine—this equity principle, and it is safe to say that the 
D.C. Circuit seriously missed the point of the questions Councilman 
instructed them to ask.213 
Part V:  The Effects of Supreme Court Abdication in 
Nashiri and Bahlul 
Supreme Court review of military commission cases is unique 
because the Court is not pressured to grant certiorari in order to 
remedy a circuit split.214 This is because all military commission 
appeals are necessarily processed, heard, and decided by the D.C. 
Circuit alone.215 Military commission appeals, therefore, necessarily 
bypass the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States’ first 
consideration governing review of certiorari petitions: that the Court 
looks to remedy circuit splits among the lower courts.216 A statutory 
system that sends all military commission appeals through one circuit 
alone makes it easier for the Court to duck the questions those 
appeals raise—even in cases where that single circuit fractures in its 
reasoning. 
The nature of the D.C. Circuit’s en banc fracture over the Bahlul 
constitutional question makes it the most compelling analogy to a 
circuit split that military commission cases have manifested thus far. 
Still, both Bahlul and Nashiri failed to make it onto the Supreme 
Court’s docket, leaving Boumediene v. Bush217 the most recent 
 
210. Brief 16-8966, supra note 184, at 3. (quoting Abney v. United States, 




214. Id. at 6 (citing Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 759 (1975)). 
215. Id. 
216. Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 
10(a). 
217. 551 U.S. 1160 (2007). 
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military Guantánamo appeal the Court picked up—a hefty ten years 
ago.218 By refusing to entertain the questions raised in these cases, the 
Supreme Court has abdicated its historical responsibility to clarify the 
law of the land in cases where lower authorities reach divergent 
conclusions. It is a technical loophole to avoid addressing substantive 
problems that will have lasting consequences on the military justice 
system. 
The Supreme Court’s refusal to hear Nashiri’s pretrial claims, for 
example, has already had deleterious effects on his case.219 Military 
commission trials conducted pursuant to the 2006 and subsequent 
2009 MCAs are notoriously inexpedient,220 and forcing Nashiri to wait 
and bring his jurisdictional challenge after his expected conviction 
means civilian court review of his case is years away.221 The most 
generous estimates predict the D.C. Circuit will not again hear 
Nashiri’s claims—next time brought post-conviction in accordance 
with Councilman abstention doctrine222—until 2024.223 At that time, if 
a future D.C. Circuit or Supreme Court composed of new and 
different judges and justices determines that Nashiri is correct on the 
 
218. Lawrence Hurley, U.S. top court leaves Guantanamo detainee’s 




219. Carol Rosenberg, Now We Know Why Defense Attorneys Quit the USS 
Cole Case. They Found a Microphone., MIAMI HERALD (Mar. 07, 2018, 
1:05 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-
world/world/americas/guantanamo /article203916094.html 
[https://perma.cc/K68G-CG8T].   
220. No official trial date has been set for Khalid Sheik Mohammad and the 
other four defendants charged with conspiring to commit the 9/11 terror 
attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City. The trial is not 
expected to begin until January 2019—more than seventeen years after 
they committed their alleged crimes and more than ten years after their 
first arraignment in 2008. See José Iglesias, About the 9/11 War Crimes 
Trial, MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 13, 2018 at 8:46 PM), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/ 
guantanamo/article1928877.html [https://perma.cc/9E6E-CM4M]. 
221. Steven Vladeck (@steve_vladeck), TWITTER (Oct. 13, 2017, 8:08 AM), 
https://twitter.com/steve_vladeck/status/918810730215899137 
[https://perma.cc/ZEY4-ZD96]; see also Brief 16-8966, supra note 184, 
at 3. 
222. Steven Vladeck (@steve_vladeck), TWITTER (Oct. 13, 2017, 8:07 AM), 
https://twitter.com/steve_vladeck/status/918810525236125696 
[https://perma.cc/ZB37-E6E4]. 
223. Steven Vladeck (@steve_vladeck), TWITTER (Oct. 13, 2017, 8:08 AM), 
https://twitter.com/steve_vladeck/status/918810730215899137 
[https://perma.cc/2FJ3-TJG7]; See also Brief 16-8966, supra note 184 
at 3 (quoting In re Al-Nashiri, 835 F.3d 110, 135 (2016)). 
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merits of his claims, then all the time, money, manpower, and other 
resources expended to see his trial through to verdict will ultimately 
have been wasted.224 
Even more important than the effects that denying certiorari will 
have on Nashiri individually are those that will percolate through the 
entire military justice system.225 Although Nashiri’s substantive claims 
are specific to his own case, the procedural challenge he raised 
implicates all military trials.226 The now-controlling D.C. Circuit 
ruling in his case broadens the Councilman abstention doctrine to 
apply to all trials by military commission.227 
The denials of certiorari in Bahlul and Nashiri are particularly 
devastating in the aggregate.228 Because the D.C. Circuit’s holding in 
Nashiri means Councilman abstention now applies to all military 
commission cases going forward, it therefore applies to any future 
detainee who recycles Bahlul’s Article III constitutional challenges. 
Put simply, the next defendant who wants to contest the 
commissions’ jurisdiction over purely domestic offenses will have to 
wait to raise the issue on post-conviction appeal. 
This is a real problem given the protracted nature of military 
commission trials—which often last for years—and the commissions’ 
apparent comfort with charging non-international law of war offenses. 
Since they were established in 2002, the Guantánamo commissions 
have relied heavily on domestic charges to convict defendants.229 Of 
the eleven military commission trials conducted since 2006, seven of 
those defendants—including Bahlul—have been charged with at least 
one purely domestic offense.230 The government shows no signs of 
abating their charging practice in this regard,231 and someone is bound 
 
224. Steven Vladeck (@steve_vladeck), TWITTER (Oct. 13, 2017, 8:09 AM), 
https://twitter.com/steve_vladeck/status/918810922596163584 
[https://perma.cc/L7QM-N96N]. See also Brief 16-8966, supra note 184, 
at 4. 




227. Steven Vladeck (@steve_vladeck), TWITTER (Oct. 13, 2017, 8:10 AM), 
https://twitter.com/steve_vladeck/status/918811111675301888 
[https://perma.cc/4HKY-BYBZ]; See also Brief 16-8966, supra note 
184, at 4 (discussing extending the Councilman doctrine to Guantanamo 
commissions).  
228. Episode 35: Will This Be the Year of Military Courts at the Supreme 
Court?, supra note 63. 
229. Vladeck, supra note 30. 
230. Id. 
231. While delivering his first State of the Union address, President Donald 
Trump stated, “I just signed an order directing Secretary Mattis to 
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to re-raise the Bahlul Article III question that fractured the D.C. 
Circuit. In other words, in light of the government’s charging practice, 
a future habeas petition asserting Bahlul’s Article III challenge could 
bring down the military commissions as the government currently 
conducts them. Unfortunately, because Councilman abstention now 
extends to military commissions after Nashiri, this inevitable 
challenge will not be re-raised for a long, long time. 
When that happens, a future makeup of the D.C. Circuit or the 
Supreme Court could decide that Bahlul was correct on the merits, 
and that military commissions lack constitutional authority to charge 
domestic offenses like inchoate conspiracy. Leaving this outcome to 
chance risks vacating a yet-unknown number of terrorist convictions 
for non-international law of war offenses. In the meantime, the 
American taxpayer will foot an exorbitant bill for resources invested 
litigating these questions indefinitely. 
Part VI:  Proposal for Amendment to the 2009 MCA 
Creating an Exception to Councilman Abstention for 
Military Commissions 
On January 30, 2018, in his first State of the Union address, 
President Donald Trump committed to keeping Guantánamo open 
indefinitely as a military detention facility for “unlawful enemy 
combatants.”232 Although expected, this announcement dampened 
hopes that the military commissions would wind down anytime soon 
in light of looming questions about their constitutional authority.233 
Because judicial resolution of these questions is currently foreclosed, 
Congress should consider enacting a legislative solution to this 
problem. I propose that Congress revise the MCA to override the 
D.C. Circuit’s extension of Councilman to military commissions. 
 
reexamine our military detention policy and to keep open the detention 
facilities at Guantánamo Bay.” Writing for The New York Times, 
Nicholas Fandos commented that “[t]his announcement was expected. 
Essentially a symbolic act, it brings executive branch policy into line 
with reality: The prison remains open for business, at least for those 
detainees who are already there.” Trump’s First State of the Union 
Speech, Annotated, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/01/30/us/politics/state-of-
the-union-2018-transcript.html [https://perma.cc/MC9T-BGRW]. 
232. Id.; see also W.J. Hennigan, President Trump’s Keeping Guantánamo 
on the Political Radar, TIME (Jan. 31, 2018), 
http://time.com/5126446/donald-trump-state-union-guantanamo/ 
[https://perma.cc/XUK2-HF3V] (discussing the implications of 
President Trump’s statements on Guantánamo). 
233. See generally Al Bahlul v. U.S., 792 F.3d 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(prefacing the statutory and constitutional issues at play in this case). 
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As a general matter, the Supreme Court has indicated that federal 
courts should only abstain in narrow, limited, and exceptional 
circumstances.234 In other words, abstention is, itself, the exception to 
the general rule,235 and exceptions to federal abstention doctrines are 
not uncommon.236 Take, for example, the Younger abstention 
doctrine.237 Younger bars federal courts from reviewing civil rights 
tort claims until any state court prosecutions arising from those 
claims have concluded.238 Even Younger—one of the broadest 
abstention doctrines, and one that is least permissive to federal 
courts—still provides exceptions to its mandate, including  allowing 
federal courts to get involved when the state law in question is 
blatantly unconstitutional.239 
Although typically judge-made law, Congress has the authority to 
legislate an exception therein. Article I, § 8, Clause 9 of the U.S. 
Constitution gives Congress the power “[t]o constitute Tribunals 
inferior to the supreme Court.”240 Article III, § 1 vests the judicial 
power of the United States in the Supreme Court and those “inferior 
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish.”241 Most importantly, Article III, § 2, clause 2 makes the 
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme and lower federal courts subject 
to Congressional regulation.242 Using this authority, Congress has the 
power to change the D.C. Circuit’s jurisdiction and require that court 
to review habeas petitions raising jurisdictional challenges to the 
military commissions. 
As previously discussed, Congress has acted upon this authority 
before with regard to the 2006 and 2009 MCAs. The 2006 MCA 
contained a provision that expressly banned Article III court collateral 
review of military commission cases.243 At that time, the statute 
stated: 
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter and 
notwithstanding any other provision of law (including section 
 
234. See COOK & SOBIESKI, JR., supra note 170. 
235. Id. 
236. Id. 
237. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
238. Id. at 41. 
239. Id.at 53-4. 
240. U.S. CONST. art. 1 §8, cl. 9. 
241. U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 1. 
242. U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2, cl. 2. 
243. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3(a)(1), 120 
Stat. 2600, 2623–24 (formerly codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950j(b)). 
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2241 of title 28 or any other habeas corpus provision), no court, 
justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider any 
claim or cause of action. . . relating to the prosecution, trial, or 
judgment of a military commission under this chapter, including 
challenges to the lawfulness of procedures of military 
commissions under this chapter.244 
The revised 2009 MCA eliminated this entire provision from the 
statute.245 As noted, the D.C. Circuit in Nashiri declined to read this 
removal as persuasive evidence that Congress intended to allow 
civilian collateral review of Guantánamo cases. Congress can now 
override Nashiri by adding another provision to the statute that 
expressly encourages—or preferably, mandates—Article III collateral 
review of Guantánamo detainees’ jurisdictional challenges. This 
revision would be compatible with longstanding Supreme Court 
doctrine that there is something very wrong with courts waiting so 
long to entertain defendants who challenge the very power of their 
tribunals to try them in the first place.246 
The D.C. Circuit is commonly referred to as the second-most 
important court in the U.S., trailing only the Supreme Court itself.247 
One could raise concerns that Congress exempting military 
commissions from Councilman doctrine would cause Guantánamo 
cases to overburden the D.C. Circuit’s docket. These concerns, 
however, would be misplaced. 
Despite its unique stature within the federal court system, the 
D.C. Circuit consistently boasts the smallest docket for any U.S. 
circuit court, even when compared to circuits that seat an identical 
number of judges. For example, the Seventh Circuit recorded 1,637 
pending cases through the September 30, 2017 reporting period, while 
the Eighth Circuit logged 1,875. The D.C. Circuit logged only 1,391 
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pending cases.248 Even more illustrative were the 3,000 new appeals 
filed with both the Seventh and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals 
during that same reporting period, compared to less than 1,000 in the 
D.C. Circuit.249 All three courts seat eleven judges.250 If concerns 
remain that an exemption would overburden the D.C. Circuit, 
Congress could further limit the number of collateral review petitions 
filed by narrowing the exception to apply to jurisdictional challenges 
only. 
Conclusion 
This year, the military commission system at Guantánamo 
entered its 16th year. Despite tremendous time and resources, the 
commissions have prosecuted fewer than a dozen people for domestic 
and international law of war offenses. The Supreme Court has not 
elected to review a Guantánamo case since 2008, and the Court’s 
denial of Bahlul and Nashiri in October 2017 came as a 
disappointment to many. Although questions about their 
constitutionality hang over the commissions, it is time to elevate the 
discussion from why the commissions might be unconstitutional to 
how we can better facilitate judicial resolution to these questions. It is 
high time for Congress to step up to the plate and legislate an 
amendment to the 2009 MCA that forces the D.C. Circuit to revisit 
this issue sooner rather than later. 
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